He gives me an essay he has just written, about how difficult it is to be far away from your country and nevertheless remain committed politically and socially. The tone is sad—about the distance, about the fact that developments in his home country are once again being written in blood and tears. As he writes in one of his books: “The Middle East has been cruel to my generation.” Most of his schoolmates are dispersed around the world in a more or less self-imposed exile. There they have admittedly often had great personal successes. But at the same time they are lost to their home countries and the region which desperately needs precisely their talents and expertise in order to extricate itself from the vicious circle of violence and oppression. Yet others have fallen victim to one or other of the bloody conflicts and power struggles which at regular intervals have afflicted the Middle East: civil wars, occupations, plots, terrorist attacks, the repressive violence of many dictatorships against their own citizens.”

MALLAT IS FROM Lebanon, where he is professor of law at the Université Saint-Joseph in Beirut. He has also worked as a guest professor at a series of prestigious seats of learning in the West. What is more, he is generally known as a leading human rights activist in the Middle East. His academic expertise is Islamic law from a comparative perspective, a field within which he has written a number of books and articles. For a long time he has fought for democracy and a state governed by law in Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq. Even in the early 1980s he became deeply involved in the opposition to Saddam Hussein. At the beginning of the 90s he helped found the International Committee for the Liberation of Iraq. In 1996 he set up Indict, an organisation whose aim was to gather together proof of Saddam’s crimes which could later be used in court.

In the struggle against Saddam, he allied himself with Ahmed Chalabi and the other Iraqi exiles who, keenly cheered on by neo-con ideologues such as Paul Wolfowitz, succeeded in getting the American Congress to adopt the so-called Iraqi Liberation Act in 1998. One consequence of this cooperation is that he is, in certain political camps, reputed to be an all-too devoted supporter of Bush’s Iraq policy. On the other hand he is also known as one of those jurists who has led the attempts, hardly popular in Washington, to get the former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon indicted before a Belgian court for his role in the massacres in 1982 in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila.

He also played a leading role in the Lebanese “Cedar Revolution,” the great demonstrations after the murder of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, who in 2005 forced Syria to leave Lebanon, a land they had occupied since the end of the Lebanese civil war. It was against the background of his involvement in this political movement that he, at the beginning of 2006, began his campaign to be elected president of Lebanon. The war between Israel and Hezbollah in the summer of 2006 has, however, led to a political paralysis in Lebanon. Today civil war threatens to break out once again, and a peaceful and open presidential election seems remote.

When one considers that political activism in this part of the world is often associated with mortal danger I wonder why he came to choose the course of politics rather than remain a pure academic. Mallat thinks that the reason was that his discipline, law, is so close to immediate solid, political realities. It was not possible for him in the long run to maintain the distinction between the academic study of law, democracy and human rights on the one hand and the practical struggle for these rights on the other. “If one lives in a country like Lebanon, one observes that human rights and justice are not merely an abstract question,” he notes wrily.

AT THE SAME time the path from the professorial study to the politics of the street was both long and crooked. Mallat, who belongs to a prominent Maronite family in Lebanon, took the first step from academic life into public debate by writing columns for daily papers and appearing as a commentator on radio and TV. Both his expertise on factual matters and his home base in the politically important Maronite community were important in this respect. In Lebanese politics religious adherence is of decisive significance, and the country’s fragile stability is based on a well-established practice which, among other things, by custom reserves the presidency for a Maronite, a Christian community with its roots in Lebanon since the seventh century.

But it was not primarily internal politics which initially attracted Mallat. Its focus on human rights led by definition away from the frontiers of his own nation. In a region where the villains and tyrants are many he came to focus on Saddam and Sharon. In the one case he aimed at an Arab dictator who with particular force symbolised the lack of democracy in the Arab world. In the other case he devoted himself to an Israeli leader who symbolised oppression of the Palestinians, whose struggle for national liberation from the colonial yoke was still not complete. But, according to Mallat, it is in both cases a question ultimately of the same struggle. “I have two guiding principles,” he says. “One is the struggle for human rights, the other is non-violence as a means for promoting this movement.”

But, explains Mallat, the tactics vary. In the case of Sharon it was a great help to use the media and world opinion, to be as visible as possible so as to apply pressure as effectively as possible. With Saddam it was different; in that case a more subtle approach behind the scenes was required. Saddam was not merely a dangerous man. As a dictator he was less worried about what the indigenous population or the international community thought. For that reason it was less likely he would be swayed by a mass media campaign.

The great turning point for Mallat was, however, the revolutionary events of 2005 in connection with the murder of Hariri. “It was no longer possible for me to remain in the background,” he says. “Gradually we were losing ground politically; colleagues and friends were being killed. I could no longer tolerate merely being a passive observer. It was more important than ever to act. It was not sufficient to be a critical intellectual, I felt. I also wanted to multiply my personal strength by speaking for and with other people.”

RUNNING A PRESIDENTIAL campaign in the way that Mallat does is, however, something quite new in Lebanon. The president is not elected directly by the people but by a vote in parliament. What is more, the choice of candidates is made from within a narrow circle of influential Maronites. Mallat has chosen instead to run an open campaign with his own home page on the internet and speeches and writings directed at the entire Lebanese people, not just an inner circle of the country’s elite. But in order to be elected he must also, in a traditional way, convince a majority both within his own religious group and in parliament.

“Our practice is that it is only Maronites, not even other Christians, who can be considered for the presidency. I would like to change that tradition; for me the most important thing is that I am a Lebanese, not that I am a Maronite. But only if I have sufficient power and influence can I work effectively for such a radical change in our constitution.”

I wonder, when one considers that Lebanon is faced with the threat of a civil war, what status his presidential campaign has now, in the summer of 2007? “Since the war in the summer of 2006 the political situation has become so blocked that parliament does not even meet. This means that a new presidential election cannot be contemplated just now. In this sense my election campaign is also in a timeout situation, even if I continue working to get ready for the moment when the situation changes. I am publishing two new books to this end, one about the Cedar Revolution, one with speeches and writings which relate to my campaign.”

To what extent can this change be accelerated by western countries, I ask. These countries have, since the end of the Second World War, in principle adopted two positions as regards pressures aiming to promote democratic developments in countries with authoritarian regimes. The USA has often chosen a harder line, with political demands backed up by military threats and an actual readiness to take up arms. Iraq may be a poor advert for this attitude, but the defenders of the USA can also point to positive examples, such as the fall of the Soviet Union and the short Kosovo war.

In Europe we have preferred to use diplomacy as far as possible. We have cajoled with advantageous financial treaties rather than beating the war drum. Not least the establishment of the EU in the shadow of the Second World War, and its subsequent expansion, offers a number of proofs that this strategy can be successful. The EU is an organisation which today comprises a number of countries who not too long ago were communist vassal states or had military dictatorships or other authoritarian systems.

FROM THIS PERSPECTIVE I wonder how Mallat views the EU’s role today, when American efforts in the Middle East seem to be grinding to a halt. Can the EU play a positive role in a similar way as they have done in relation to other Mediterranean countries, such as Greece, Spain, Portugal, Cyprus and to a certain extent Turkey?

“Let me begin with a provocative statement,” he says. “The conflict between Israel and the Arab countries cannot be solved before Israel, Lebanon and Palestine are part of Europe. What do I mean by that? Europe is enormously important. Purely geographically, of course, in its capacity as a close neighbour—since Cyprus became a member, the EU has actually had a frontier with Lebanon. But above all as we in the Middle East need a catalyst, a mighty vision which is both original and humanist enough to dissolve our deep conflicts. And that idea is Europe. How that is to be achieved is a different matter, but I am sure that we will not achieve peace until we have created a structure within the framework of which Lebanon and Israel find a place in Europe.”

The idea of the EU as a combined motor for peace and growth has, of course, a large measure of credibility from a historical perspective, at the same time it is also the case that the desire for expansion to date seems to be limited, at least as regards the Muslim countries. If Turkey’s application has now met with opposition what hope can there be for Lebanon?

Mallat nods sadly and admits that many, perhaps, most Europeans are tired of expansion, immigration and diversity. But, he adds immediately, the inclusive structure he is indicating does not need to imply formal membership. “I take as my starting point Romano Prodi’s brilliant idea from 2002, what he called the ‘politics of neighbourhood.’ The idea is to admit countries in the EU’s immediate vicinity, provide them with the opportunity of participating in “the European dream” at the same time as they in their turn respect a certain limitation in their association with the EU. They would be offered almost everything except formal membership and full participation in the purely political institutions: access to structural funds, coordination of the financial system, gradual opportunity for immigration, etc. That is the key. If the Palestinian refugees claim the right to migration and work, a large part of the problem would be on its way to being solved.

“On the other hand, an arrangement of this kind would take into account Europeans’ understandable anxiety at the idea of full membership. The problem has to do with population numbers—not merely the fear of drowning in a flood of immigration, but also the concern at losing democratic control. And hand on heart: what would Israel or Lebanon gain from being able to vote in Brussels that they do not already have through an association? Just look at Norway! They would in time be given a status similar to that of Lichtenstein now. I think this too would be a form which would suit Turkey better than full membership. Turkey would be able to retain its national institutions, and the EU would avoid a divisive debate on whether Turkey really qualifies as a European country.”

MALLAT THINKS THAT Europe represents several stages of hope. The final hope is to solve the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, but before this happens people hope that the EU can create a firm structure promoting economic development and democratic reforms.

“What we in Lebanon’s civilian society demand of Europe in the first stage is that you quite simply exist here, but you are present with your eyes and voices. When, in 2005, we had our first free parliamentary elections for 30 years, you were here. When, now, it is time to choose a new president we hope and pray that you will again be on site. Not to support Mallat as as a candidate—that would crush my chances—but to support free debate and true democracy.”

But, I cannot resist asking, how does he see the opportunity of realising his dream if he takes off his visionary political hat and puts on his critical academic hat?

Mallat chuckles and admits that in this capacity he is, of course, a tad more pessimistic. “Beyond the positive direction—Prodi’s ‘politics of proximity’—I see several negative dimensions. The American presence in Israel would not let the EU in as long as they can rely on the USA’s power. There is the EU’s internal crisis after the referendums on the constitution in France and Holland, even if the new treaty negotiated during the Merkel summer of 2007 provides some renewed hope in this respect. And finally, there is the extremism that has taken root in the Muslim world and which has also been given violent expression in Europe.”

Populärt

De sagolika systrarna Mitford

Bland de omtalade systrarna Mitford fanns både skickliga författare, fascistsympatisörer, en hertiginna och en kommunist, skriver Moa Ekbom.

Moa Ekbom Kultur 2025 4

What role, I ask, is played by Arab nationalism and in particular the choice of violence as a political method? You mentioned earlier that your guiding principles are human rights and non-violence. I have often wondered why non-violence has not been adopted as a strategy in Palestine. Gandhi taught the world that non-violence works best precisely in the struggle against a democracy—like Israel—rather than in the struggle against more ruthless authoritarian regimes. It feels, tragically, like a “road not taken.”

“This is a difficult and extremely serious question,” he replies. “I have pleaded for a strategy of that kind myself. Gandhi is unfortunately an exception in the history of national freedom movements. More typical and relevant for the struggle of the Arabs was the terrible war of liberation in Algeria in which hundreds of thousands of people died. Gandhi was exceptional—and I cannot compare myself with him even if I regard him as a great inspiration. Him and Mandela. But how many Gandhis and Mandelas can we hope for? And not even Mandela rejected violence as a political instrument.”

I WONDER WHETHER Mallat believes that the Americans and those who supported their intervention in Iraq underestimated nationalism as a political force. Most people do not, despite everything, want their country to be occupied, even if it happens in the name of democracy and human rights. This was a lesson which perhaps should have been learnt definitively after the Vietnam war. This applies especially to those so-called liberal hawks who were not driven by a regard for purely national interests, but simply wanted to promote human rights. Has a tragic victim of the catastrophic Iraq war been the offensive struggle for human rights?

“I believe that I underestimated the nationalist dimension. Of course, I was against the invasion even if I was for the fall of Saddam. And when the invasion was a fact, I wished it to be concluded as quickly as possible. Nevertheless, I did not understand how strongly and deeply the nationalist resistance would become. And bearing in mind how wrong I, and many others, were on this issue of the nationalist response, I now hesitate to predict the future.”

Mallat at the same time notes that even if the Iraq war shows problems in military interventions, the question remains nevertheless as to what we can and should do in cases such as Rwanda, Darfur and Zimbabwe. Pure passivity cannot be our only alternative. It must be possible to legitimise some mixture of military threats and promises of help within a framework of a multilateral action.

“For me, however,” he concludes, “the most important thing is that we achieve a success story which can serve as an example in the Middle East. So far there is no example of this kind, even if Lebanon to some extent was on the way to becoming such a success story for a couple of months. We need more, something which is lasting, like Spain and Portugal after the fall of their dictatorships and their entry into the EU. The most likely candidates in my part of the world are Morocco and Lebanon. Lebanon with its modest but nevertheless real experience of non-violence. At least if we get an honourable, powerful and democratically elected president.”

Translated by Phil Holmes