Few conceptual distinctions are as relevant in the contemporary political debate, as between multiculturalism as state policy – for which I am, in this text, using the term multiculturalismHave a think about what distinct terms would suit you best here. I’ve given suggestions, but you may think of something better. There really is only one word for this in English, so it’ll involve a little invention.Have a think about what distinct terms would suit you best here. I’ve given suggestions, but you may think of something better. There really is only one word for this in English, so it’ll involve a little invention. – and multiculturalism as a social experience – which I term multiculture. While multiculture is stretchable and timeless, multiculturalism is time-bound and captures the ideas about the relationship between identity, politics and culture at the turn of the 1960s – and in the 1970s it took hold amongst broad political elites in a dozen Western countries.

Multiculturalism as it was formulated in policies – specifically, recognition and special rights for culturally-defined minority groups – has certainly had weak public support and has only been implemented to a limited extent in a legal sense. Nevertheless, it has guided the debate within the field of integration in a number of countries. The state of play at the end of the 1990s was captured elegantly in the title of Nathan Glazer’s 1997 book: We Are All Multiculturalists Now.

Since then, a lot has happened. During the autumn and winter of 2010 – 2011, several leading European politicians have shunned multiculturalism. The first was German Chancellor Angela Merkel in a speech in Potsdam in October 2010, in which she claimed, ”The multicultural model has failed, completely failed”. In January 2011, she was followed by British Prime Minister David Cameron after he chose to use his speech at a security conference in Munich to bring up integration problems at home, which he attributed to ”doctrinal state multiculturalism”. A month later, even French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s voice was added to the choir of complaints, when in a TV interview he questioned the premise that ‘le multiculturalisme’ was not a failure.

Although the British, German and French experiences of immigration and multiculture are different, and although only the UK implemented what in the social sciences would be described as a multicultural model, it is reasonable to argue that the three leaders alluded to the same thing when they talked about multiculturalism: the idea that groups of individuals with different ethnicities, cultures and languages can live side-by-side in a democratic society, without the need for adaptation to the majority culture. Merkel, Cameron and Sarkozy called simultaneously for the rejection of multiculturalism in favour of greater integration of newcomers, who must learn the majority population’s language and acquire its liberal values and democratic culture. This is a basic requirement for communities to cohere.

The rejection of multiculturalism has been interpreted by many as a setback for the multiculture society. Not least in the Swedish debate, there are many examples of how both those who are for and against have turned away from multiculturalism, and done their best to confuse multiculturalism with multiculture. The Sweden Democrats, which is the only parliamentary party in Sweden that is opposed not only to multiculturalism but also to multiculture, has applauded Cameron’s and Sarkozy’s statements, while on the culture pages one can read a series of analyses that present criticism of multiculturalism as a covert struggle against the multiculture society, or alternatively as a tactical attempt to attract votes from anti-immigration parties.

Of course, there are many among multiculturalism’s critics who want to see a more homogeneous society and a reduction in immigration. The distinction is further complicated by the fact that there are negative social experiences that have been taken as evidence that multiculturalism has failed: the argument rests on empirical claims about immigrants being overrepresented in unemployment and crime statistics, and on specific problems related only to immigrant groups (the honour culture, Islamic terrorism, etc.). Such conceptual distinction is easier in theory than in practice.

The main problem with the mixing of multiculturalism and multiculture is not, however, that the person who advances legitimate criticism is under suspicion of having hidden purposes or of actually being racist. Worse is, on reflection, that it reinforces a completely absurd notion: that multiculturalism, as formulated in a few Western countries at a specific point in history, is the only possible way to bring about a multiculture society. So strong is the idea that social diversity can only be guaranteed by state sanction, with its multicultural immigrant- and identity politics, that those who dislike this particularistic multiculturalism, in whole or in part, are also expected to reject multiculture. So strong is the link between multiculturalism and anti-nationalism that anyone who dislikes multiculturalism is also assumed to be a nationalist.

The scope for formulating a new ideal of multiculture, other than the multiculturalist one is, in the Swedish context, seen as extremely limited. Against this I argue not only that another multiculture is possible, but also that it is highly doubtful that we have ever even had a multiculture society. The question is therefore not so much how to defend the diversity we have, as how we should turn Sweden into a multiculture society; and if we really want it.

Three aspects of Swedish multiculturalism are important to emphasise in this context. First, multiculturalism is fundamentally reactive. It was formulated as the antithesis of nationalism and belongs in a larger context of an intellectual revolt against the nation state’s authorities and structures. The national was a part of the symbolism; the demolition of which formed the 68-generation’s political worldview: from oppressive homogeneous nation-state to tolerant multicultural state. The protection of minority cultures was as natural as taking away the majority culture’s symbols (flag, royal family, church, army, history, etc.) and one was supposed to promote it and ra.

There is a straight line from Carl Johan De Geer’s invitation in 1967: ”Disappoint the fatherland, be unpatriotic” through to the Discrimination Ombudsman’s December parties and winter gifts of the 2000s. At the root lies a vision of multiculture as a zero-sum game: for immigrants to be able to settle and thrive, the Swedish character must be deconstructed. This society of multiculturalism and anti-nationalism has resulted both in an exaggerated distrust of those who speak of the need to keep society together with a common identity, and in an exaggerated belief in the benefits of throwing national symbols into the dustbin of history.

The second peculiarity that is important to point out is how, in all normative social theory, the central concept of tolerance in multiculturalism’s world of ideas has come to be defined as acceptance. We tolerate the minority by accepting them. It was his rejection of this view that prompted David Cameron to distance himself from what he termed ”passive tolerance” advocating instead a ”muscular liberalism”.

In Sweden, this vision of tolerance has been codified as acceptance through the so-called goal of freedom of choice, which was one of three critical elements of the 1975 shift in immigration policy. The immigrant could choose whether they wanted to adapt to society or not. Becoming Swedish was a matter of individual choice, over which the state did not express any preference.

This accepting-tolerance has harmonised well with Sweden’s widespread value-relativistic ideals. Every culture has its traditions, norms and customs, and it is not up to us to evaluate or criticise them. To show respect is to leave alone. This norm of value-relativism has, on an ideological level, often legitimised a political unwillingness, even fear, of criticising ‘the other’. In their worst moments, value-relativism and accepting-tolerance have caused great harm to individuals, such as when public authorities have turned a blind eye to abuses committed in minority communities, or when politicians and intellectuals have excused racism emanating from minority groups.

But, thirdly, it is also important to clarify the limited extent to which multiculturalism has, after all, been implemented in practice. Only in exceptional cases, has value-relativism influenced legislative or judicial matters. Equality before the law has been maintained in Sweden for the vast majority, and in almost all areas. (An important exception to this was the marriage law, which made it possible for underage immigrants to marry, provided it was allowed in their country of origin.)

Nor has there ever been talk of seriously letting other cultures’ value systems to change the Swedish majority’s culture. It is a fact that immigrants, as they have come to be known, have been allowed to make their mark on, and modify, Swedish society. They filled restaurants and convenience stores, soccer fields and prisons. But at the same time politics, business, newspaper editors, the unions and the churches continued to reflect a homogenous Swedish majority culture.

The sum of this is a relatively homogeneous society with a strong welfare state that welcomed a large number of immigrants. We have had a specific policy for them. We wanted to take care of them and be concerned about them. We have mirrored our own good self-esteem in them (”We like different” as Aftonbladetputs it). They frighten us. But, and this is critical, we have only been moderately interested in them.

Therefore, it is only with great reservations that Sweden can be described as a multiculture society. And on this basis, it is not so obvious how the ongoing arrangement with multiculturalism constitutes a threat to multiculture. Do we No question mark for this sentence.No question mark for this sentence.really want to have a multiculture society – one that extends beyond the reception of refugees because we must, or because we want to be good, one in which we live together under the same laws while respecting the profound cultural differences – if so, it requires more changes. We can contrast the Swedish experience with two existing multicultures that could constitute sources of inspiration.

We can turn to the west and be inspired by the United States. If we abstract the essence of the American assimilation model (which of course is something completely different to how the assimilation process works in reality), this is all about individuals with different backgrounds being assimilated into an ever-changing common American culture. The American nation holds within it many ethnicities. To be American is to have a different background than most other Americans. To be American is to find a place for one’s own religion and culture in a shared context that is primarily supported by a common language and a common political and public system that bridges ethnic and religious divisions.

But if this model is difficult to apply in the U.S. it is probably impossible to transfer to Europe. It would require a fundamental change in how we define culture and nationality. European national identities are not open in the same way, even for those who learn the language, mores and norms. The nations are all based on ethnic grounds. Therefore, dual citizenship – the so-called ‘hyphenated identity’ – is just as rare in Europe as it is common in the United States. Advocating assimilation in Europe is much more problematic than doing it in the U.S. because in a European context it can only be interpreted as a one-way street, and not as a mutual coming-together.

The second option is to instead go back in European history and rediscover the tradition of multiculture that has been forgotten. Not least, a number of cities in Central and Eastern Europe – especially perhaps in Galicia and Transylvania as well as cosmopolitan cities such as Constantinople – tells a story of multiculture as lived experience from a time long before the identity politics of multiculturalism had been invented.

Characteristic of this historical era was how the need for a common public space, in a city where people spoke different languages and professed different religions, was met not by a culture assimilating the ‘others’, but through a combination of formal rules and informal norms. Central was the recognition of the mutual need for knowledge of each other’s languages, religions and customs, and from this knowledge grew tolerance ideals founded in respect, not acceptance.

This historic multicultural experience was crushed by Turkish, Romanian, Hungarian and Polish nationalists, by German and domestic Nazis, and by the Russian and indigenous communists. All made common cause against this experience and formulated instead the ideals that have had such overwhelming success: to each nation a state, in each state a people.

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It is this nationalistic tradition that the Sweden Democrats have joined. Nowhere else on the Swedish political map can one find supporters of nationalism. All others claim, as we know, to want to have a multiculture while recognising the problems with integration. But few are willing to concretise the meaning. The lack of policies and visions on the meaning of multiculture and integration are striking. All speak well of the concept, but no one wants to fill it with a coherent content.

For the term ”multiculture society” to be meaningful, it must aim at something more than different cultures living side-by-side in more-or-less ethnically homogeneous enclaves. In a multicultural society, we share a public space. Otherwise it is not a society, however diverse it may be.

But what should the public space consist of? The trend in European politics in the 2000s was to highlight a specific set of liberal values around which the nation is considered to be unified, and to which immigrants should be forced to adapt. In Sweden, only a few cautious steps have yet been taken in this direction. Established politicians still hesitate to define criteria for the national community.

Do we choose the American ideal model, in which religion and culture are irrelevant in the public domain, and assume at the same time that we can come to terms with deep-rooted beliefs that a person born in Sarajevo or Beirut will never be ‘pure Swedish’? It also requires that we let other cultures make their mark, even on something other than the politically innocuous, which of course represents a challenge to the notion of common national values.

Trying to recreate a lost, and partly mythical, central European urban multiculture is obviously futile. Neither Sweden nor any other European nation is going to teach a multilingual future. But to give the ethnic, cultural and religious life experiences a larger place in the public sphere is still an option. In particular, increased cultural knowledge seems to be an obvious target for anyone seeking a multiculture society characterised by tolerance. With knowledge follows also the possibility to criticise and evaluate, which is a prerequisite for the ability to tolerate. Only a tolerance that is grounded in knowledge about what it is you tolerate, is desirable.

Anyone who hasn’t even the most basic knowledge of Islam cannot, in any meaningful way, tolerate Muslims. At the same time, the awareness of a fundamental pluralism in human societies is, of course, a prerequisite for tolerance to be meaningful – if we instead assume that we actually know that a specific set of values is the best, then of course assimilation would be the most defensible model. Therefore, even this option leads inevitably to a questioning of values as the basis for the national community.

We have never been multicultural. If we want to become so, then we need to start to come to terms with the legacy of the last decades of multiculturalism. It is, to say the least, vain to imagine that a (functioning) cultural diversity should be dependent on the very specific political and ideological arrangements that developed in North America and Western Europe during the 1970s.